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Abstract—We introduce the paradigm of adversarial attacks
that target the dynamics of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS).
To facilitate the analysis of such attacks, we present multi-
ple approaches to the modeling of CAS as dynamical, data-
driven, and game-theoretic systems, and develop quantitative
definitions of attack, vulnerability, and resilience in the context
of CAS security. Furthermore, we propose a comprehensive set
of schemes for classification of attacks and attack surfaces in
CAS, complemented with examples of practical attacks. Building
on this foundation, we propose a framework based on rein-
forcement learning for simulation and analysis of attacks on
CAS, and demonstrate its performance through three real-world
case studies of targeting power grids, destabilization of terrorist
organizations, and manipulation of machine learning agents. We
also discuss potential mitigation techniques, and remark on future
research directions in analysis and design of secure complex
adaptive systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From brains and immune systems, to societies and ecosys-
tems, many natural phenomena are categorized as Complex
Adaptive Systems (CAS). Such systems are characterized
by the complex behaviors that are the emergent results of
nonlinear interactions between a large number of components
at different levels of system’s organization [1]. CAS are
generally decentralized and governed by adaptive dynamics
that enable their intrinsic adaptation and evolution in changing
environments [2]. Over the past decades, the multidisciplinary
framework of CAS has been extensively applied to study
natural mechanisms of emergent behavior in various domains,
ranging from anatomical systems and biological behavior [3]
to social and economical systems [4].
Furthermore, the decentralized and adaptive operation of
CAS has inspired numerous engineering solutions for dis-
tributed system architectures, such as smart power grids [5],
autonomous navigation [6], and the Internet of Things (IoT)
[7]. Equipment of such distributed systems with CAS-inspired
mechanisms is a promising approach to the challenging task
of control and management of the increasingly complex and
heterogeneous systems [8]. In particular, the Self-organization
aspect of CAS enables the emergence of order and pattern from
uncoordinated actions of autonomous agents in multi-agent
distributed settings [9]. In self-organizing systems, individual
agents are capable of adapting to changes in the environment
via autonomic tuning of their configurable parameters to
enhance individual as well as global operations of dynamic
distributed systems.
The growing interest in adoption of CAS architectures in
mission-critical applications intensifies the need for investigat-
ing the security aspects of such systems. While the distribution
of responsibilities and capabilities among multiple agents in
CAS seemingly relieves the threats posed by single points
of failure, the complexity of dynamics in such systems gives
rise to unique challenges in quantifying and ensuring their re-
silience and robustness in hostile environments and adversarial
conditions. While the body of work on CAS presents many
contributions towards analysis of resilience against random
and natural perturbations, current state of the art leaves major
gaps in understanding and enhancement of resilience against
targeted attacks and adversarial actions.
This paper aims to develop a comprehensive foundation
for analysis and enhancement of resilience in natural and
engineered CAS against adversarial actions. To this end, we
study and formalize the threats posed by attacks targeting the
adaptive dynamics of such systems. Accordingly, the main
contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We introduce three approaches to the modeling of CAS,
namely: dynamical systems model, Dynamic Data-Driven
Application Systems (DDDAS) model, and game theo-
retic model of strategic network formation.
2) We propose quantitative definitions of attack, vulnerabil-
ity, and resilience in the context of CAS security.
3) We develop a comprehensive set of schemes for classi-
fication of attack surfaces in CAS, and discuss generic
instances of active and passive adversarial actions target-
ing these surfaces.
4) We propose a framework based on reinforcement learning
for simulation and analysis of attacks on CAS.
5) We demonstrate the practical application of our proposed
framework in three practical case studies: induction of
cascade failures in power grids, destabilization of terrorist
organizations, and manipulation of deep reinforcement
learning agents.
6) We present a discussion on potential defensive and miti-
gation techniques.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II provides an overview of CAS and the relevant background.
Section III presents models for analysis of CAS. Section IV
details our proposed definitions of attack, vulnerability, and
resilience. Section V presents classifications of vulnerabilities
and attack surfaces in CAS, followed by the proposal of a
framework for simulation of adversarial actions and analysis of
their impact on CAS in Section VI. Section VII demonstrates
the application of this framework in three practical case
studies. Section VIII discusses potential approaches towards
mitigation of such attacks, and Section IX concludes the paper
with remarks on future research directions.
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II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly introduce the paradigm of com-
plex systems and their adaptivity to provide the reader with an
overview of fundamental concepts and notions required for the
remainder of this paper. It must be noted that this background
is by no means comprehensive, and the interested reader may
refer to sources such as [10] and [11] for in-depth introductions
to CAS.
A. Complex Adaptive Systems
Complexity, as a quantifiable measure, is yet to obtain a
unified and consistent definition. From the multitude of defini-
tions that have emerged from the field of complexity science
[12], we abide by the definition presented by Mitchell [1]: “A
complex adaptive system is a system in which large networks
of components with simple rules of operation and no central
control give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated
information processing, and adaptation. Such systems exhibit
nontrivial emergent and self-organizing behaviors.”
Accordingly, the most general characteristics of CAS are
identified as [2]:
• Large numbers of constituent elements and interac-
tions
• Non-decomposability, i.e., components cannot be sep-
arately studied due to interactions
• Nonlinearity of dynamics and behavior
• Various forms of hierarchical structure
• Emergent behavior
• Self-organization
• Co-evolution with other complex entities or the envi-
ronment.
The concepts of emergence and self-organization are of
particular significance in the scope of our work. Emergence
in CAS refers to the occurrence of properties and behavior in
a system that are not present in the constituent components,
i.e., global properties resulting from local interactions are
emergent [13]. Similarly, Self-Organization is the emergence
of global coherence out of local interactions [14]. Natural
instances of self-organization include the swarming formation
of birds in flight, and the emergence of cognitive abilities from
interactions of neurons in the brain.
B. Vulnerability and Resilience of CAS
The resilience of complex systems has been the subject
of active research in diverse disciplines, ranging from ecology
[15] and epidemiology [16] to power distribution systems [17]
and counter-terrorism [18]. Yet, the bulk of available literature
on this topic emphasize on resilience of CAS to naturally
occurring and random perturbations. Amid the spectrum of
definitions considered in such works [19], one of the most
general definitions of resilience is: “The ability of a system
to endure failure and recover from mishaps by restoring its
capacities” [20]. While this definition captures the objectives
of system-level studies, it fails to satisfy the requirements of se-
curity analyses. While recovery from failure may demonstrate
the long-term sustainability of system’s operations, the security
consequences of short-term failures may be catastrophic. For
instance, exposure of confidential information in a cloud com-
puting platform, however technically recoverable, may incur
severe damages to the users and operators of the platform.
Therefore, there is a need for security-oriented alternatives of
this definition.
Similarly, the concept of vulnerability in CAS is defined
either too loosely, or too context-dependent. For instance, [21]
defines vulnerability as the system’s inability to resist stresses,
which may be exploited by threats and hazards. On the other
hand, [22] provides a network-oriented definition as links or
nodes whose removal adversely impact the functions of a
complex network. In the context of disaster mitigation, [23]
defines vulnerability as “the human product of any physical
exposure to a distater that results in some degree of loss.”
It is evident that a generic and quantitative definition of
vulnerability is needed to form the basis of a quantitative
framework for security analysis of CAS.
In Section IV, we utilize the dynamical model of CAS
to develop such definitions of resilience and vulnerability for
analysis of security in such systems.
III. MODELS OF CAS
In this section, we present three approaches to modeling
the behavior of CAS. First, we introduce the dynamical system
model and the relevant terminology, which will form the
basis of defining resilience, vulnerability, and attack in Section
IV. This approach is complemented by the Dynamic Data-
Driven Application System (DDDAS) abstraction, as well as a
game-theoretic model of network formation. Having multiple
approaches enables various levels of abstraction for high-
dimensional CAS, thereby providing multiple perspectives for
capturing the structure and dynamics of such systems. These
approaches are detailed below.
A. Dynamical Model
CAS are dynamical systems, meaning that their states
change as a function of time. In this perspective, the dynamics
of CAS can be modeled as:
x˙(t) = f(x(t), β(t)) (1)
Where x˙(t) is the first-order derivative of x with respect
to t, x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) is the n-dimensional state of CAS,
β is the state of the environment (or alternatively, control
input), and f is the dynamics of the system. The set of
all possible configurations of x is termed the phase space
of the system, henceforth denoted by X . A solution x(t)
to the equation 1 constitutes a trajectory in phase space.
Any trajectory is uniquely defined by the initial conditions,
x(0) ≡ x0. Accordingly, the Time-T Flow φT for initial
conditions x(0) is defined as φT (x(0)) = x(T ).
In dynamical systems, an attractor is a bounded region in
phase space to which trajectories with certain initial conditions
come arbitrarily close. Formally, an attractor is an invariant set
Λ ∈ X , where trajectories of perturbations that lead to states
outside of Λ eventually return to Λ. Attractors may be isolated
points, limiting cycles, or more complex objects in the phase
space.
A basin of attraction Ω(Λ) is the set of all states which
fall on trajectories that lead to attractor Λ. Formally,
Ω(Λ) = {x ∈ X : lim
t→∞φt(x) ∈ Λ} (2)
Accordingly, the basin boundary ∂Ω of a CAS is defined
as the set of states that are not in any basin. Formally:
∂Ω = X −
⋃
i
Ω(Λi) (3)
Even though the dynamical model provides a fundamental
mathematical perspective on the behavior of CAS, the abstrac-
tion and computational aspects of this model become severely
restricted in high-dimensional systems. Therefore, alternative
models are often used to simplify the dynamical representation
and abstraction of CAS.
B. DDDAS Model
The decentralized adaptive behavior of CAS implies the
existence of a feedback control loop in the constituent com-
ponents. Accordingly, each component of CAS monitors the
changes in its environment, analyzes the observations and
its internal state with respect to local rules and objectives,
and adjusts its operating parameters accordingly. This process
can be accurately captured within the framework of Dynamic
Data-Driven Application System (DDDAS). A DDDAS is a
symbiotic feedback control system, which can dynamically
analyze the state of system and its environment to control and
determine when, where, and how it is best to gather additional
data, and in reverse, can dynamically steer the applications
based on the obtained measurements [24]. The operational
cycle of an agent in a generic distributed DDDAS comprises
of 4 components:
• Sensing: Observing the state of agent’s environment
and retrieving relevant information that may be dis-
seminated by other agents
• Information Sharing: Communicating agent’s current
state and observations with other agents
• Data Fusion and Analytics: Integration and processing
of observed and retrieved information
• Self-Configuration: Configuration of agent’s functional
parameters according to processed information
Figure 1 illustrates the anatomy of a DDDAS cycle.
Fig. 1: Operational cycle of distributed DDDAS
Since the inception of DDDAS, this framework has
spawned numerous applications such as environment analy-
sis (e.g., weather [25]); robotic systems (e.g., coordination
and swarming of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [26] and
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) [27]); image processing
(e.g., target tracking [28]), and embedded computing (e.g.,
hardware/software designs [29]). Furthermore, recent literature
illustrates the application of this framework to the analysis of
generic complex systems [30].
C. Network Formation Game Model
CAS are networks comprised of a large number of var-
ious agents, each with unique requirements and capabilities,
leading to heterogeneity in various aspects of the systems.
Each individual agent in this network aims to optimize its
local objectives, such as energy consumption, computational
performance, reliability, and resilience, through interactions
with other agents in the network. The actions and interactions
of these agents give rise to emergent patterns at macro-
scale, which drive the system-level behavior of self-organizing
networks.
To enable the analysis of emergent behaviors, stability, and
resilience of CAS, one approach is to model the dynamics of
interactions as strategic network formation games [31] that pro-
vides a framework for analysis of self-organizing dynamics for
generic designs and applications. In such games, every agent
desires to establish the optimal set of links to other agents
which maximizes the agent’s reward or utility. Depending
on system specifications, a link in this setting may represent
inter-node communications, routing hop, information sharing,
computation and communication resource sharing, synchro-
nized actuation, proximity, trust, or any other quantifiable
relationship. Accordingly, the dynamics of interactions can
be captured by a network formation game Γ(N,U,A, (G,F ))
with complete or incomplete information, where N is the set of
all agents, A is the set of all actions available to players, U =
{U1, U2, ..., UN} is the set of each agent’s payoff function,
G(N,E) is the graph of N vertex with the directional or undi-
rectional weighted edge-set E representing the network topol-
ogy, and F = {F1, F2, ..., Fn} is the set of attribute vectors
representing the exogenous features and characteristics of each
individual. The tuple (G,F ) is the information available to all
players on the game settings. Each agent i ∈ N also bears an
idiosyncratic profile εi, capturing the traits and characteristics
of individuals that affect their decision in link establishment,
but are not known to other agents. Such characteristics may
include experience and learning profile, priority of objectives,
and level of trust. The actions of players in this game are
their establishment or removal of heterogeneous links to other
players. Let Gij be the ij-th component of the adjacency
matrix of the network. The action of player i is denoted by
Gi = ((Gi,1, Ei,1), (Gi,2, Ei,2), ..., (Gi,|N |, Ei,|N |)) ∈ A ⊂
mi × [w ∈Wi ⊆ R]|N | where mi is the number of link types
available to player i and Wi is the set of possible link weights
for i.
Various types of equilibria and stability can be defined
for such games, including Nash Stability (NS) and Pairwise
Stability (PS) [32]. As illustrated by the example in Figure 2,
these different criteria for stability do not necessarily overlap
and need to be chosen according to the problem at hand.
By choosing the relevant criteria for stability and defining
suitable payoff functions Ui∈N to account for relevant costs
and incentives of game states and trajectories, this model
allows for analysis of generic parametric bounds and rela-
tions in establishment of emerging topologies, behaviors, and
Fig. 2: Disjoint criteria for stability in network formation
games. Numerical values represent the payoff of each node,
NS: Nash-Stable, PS: Pairwise-Stable
dynamical stability within the game abstraction. Furthermore,
this game theoretic modeling of self-organizing behavior pro-
vides the formal analysis of behaviors and interactions by
considering the adversary as another player in the game. Also,
network formation games can enjoy the benefits of many
strong analytical toolsets such as graph theory, category theory,
network science, and cooperative optimal control.
IV. THREAT MODEL
The adaptive dynamics of CAS gives rise to a variety of
vulnerabilities and attack surfaces. By definition, the macro-
scale behavior of such systems is the emergent result of
micro-scale actions of local or individual elements. Therefore,
adversarial perturbations of micro-scale structure and dynamics
may result in amplification of perturbations and manipulation
of the macro-scale behavior.
To ensure a consistent and comprehensive study of such
attacks, we first develop suitable definitions of attack, vulner-
ability, and resilience in CAS. We differentiate between two
types of attacks, namely passive and active attacks. Passive
attacks aim at exposure of structural and dynamical properties
of the targeted CAS, and do not require exertion of additional
input to the system. Instances of such attacks are traffic
analysis [33] and inference of dynamics [18]. On the other
hand, Active attacks involve the implementation of adversarial
actions to achieve an adversarial objective. Building on the dy-
namical model of Section III-A, we define adversarial action
as the intentional manipulation of either the state or dynamics
of CAS, such that the resulting state-space trajectory passes
through states, which may include states outside of desired
basins of attraction, states within undesired submanifold of the
phase space (e.g., undesired basins of attraction), or ill-defined
states within a modified phase space. Accordingly, the modes
of adversarial actions can be categorized as those perturbing
the state configuration of CAS, and those that manipulate the
dynamics of CAS, formalized as follows:
1) State Manipulation: Let γ(xt) be the perturbation to
state xt ∈ X , i.e., the perturbed state is obtained via xpt =
xt + γ(xt). The problem of adversarial state manipulation is
to devise the function γ(xt) such that at an arbitrary time T :
xT =
∫ T
t0
f(xt + γ(xt), βt)dt ∈ X∗ (4)
Where t0 is the initial time, and X∗ ∈ X ′ is the set of
states within the space of undesired states X
′
which conform
to adversarial objectives. It is noteworthy that a sustainable
impact is imposed when the adversary aims for driving the
target into X∗’s basins of attraction.
Alternatively, if the objective is to reach specific trajectories
µ(t) in the space of undesired trajectories M rather than
particular states, the problem can be rearranged as devising
γ(xt) s.t. some measure of distance between the original
and desired trajectory becomes smaller than an arbitrary error
threshold , i.e.,
‖x˙(t)− µ˙(t)‖ = ‖F (xt + γ(xt), βt)− µ˙(t)‖ <  (5)
2) Dynamics Manipulation: Let λ(xt, βt) be the perturba-
tion to the environment (alternatively, it can be viewed as con-
trol input). The problem of adversarial dynamics manipulation
is to devise a suitable control perturbation λ(xt, βt), such that
at an arbitrary time T :
xT =
∫ T
t0
f(xt, βt + λ(xt, βt))dt ∈ X∗ (6)
It must be noted that X∗ is not necessarily a subset of X , as
the phase space may shift due to perturbations. Alternatively,
the problem of reaching specific trajectories can be formulated
similarly to the case of state manipulation, with the following
optimization objective:
‖x˙(t)− µ˙(t)‖ = ‖F (xt, βt + λ(xt))− µ˙(t)‖ <  (7)
With the concept of attack formalized, we can construct
suitable measures of vulnerability and resilience on the same
grounds. We adopt a well-established fact from the realm
of cyber-security that no system can be completely secure
against all possible attacks. Hence, the objective of securing a
system becomes deterrence of attacks in an economic sense,
namely making successful attacks as costly as possible [34].
Accordingly, we define the vulnerability of an element (state,
trajectory, or dynamics) in a CAS to a specific adversarial
action, as the inverse of the minimum amount of cost incurred
to the adversary to impose the maximum achievable cost to the
targeted CAS, via implementing the adversarial action on the
designated element. This definition assumes that adversarial
cost Cadv ≥ 1, and hence the value of vulnerability is in
the range [0, 1], whose unit is determined by the dimensions
of adversarial cost Cadv . In a similar manner, we define the
resilience of a CAS against a certain attack as the minimum
cost imposed on the adversary to successfully implement that
adversarial action and force the CAS into an undesired state or
trajectory. The selection of adversarial and CAS cost metrics
is highly dependent on the context of analysis. One simple
instance of choices for adversarial cost can be the minimum
number of perturbations required for a successful attack. A
similar choice for the CAS cost is the loss of connectivity in
the network model of its interactions.
V. CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACK SURFACES
Attack surfaces are structural and dynamical components
of CAS that may be targeted in active and passive attacks.
In this section, we present three schemes categorizing such
components, and provide attack instances for each identified
component.
1) CIA-based: The first approach concentrates on the se-
curity dimensions being attacked. The general dimensions of
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Fig. 3: Instances of potential attacks on data-driven self-organizing systems.
security are Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, forming
the CIA triad of security [35]. Confidentiality refers to the
restriction of unauthorized access to protected information.
Examples of attacks on confidentiality in CAS include the
inference of states, dynamics, and interaction protocols in
a self-organizing swarm of UAVs. Integrity is maintaining
and assuring the accurate functioning of the system in the
intended manner. An instance of corresponding attacks is
manipulation of a distributed autonomous navigation system
to induce collisions. Availability is assuring the uninterrupted
operation of the system. Induction of cascade failures in power
distribution systems is a well-established instance of such
attacks on CAS.
2) DDDAS-based: Another approach to classification of
attack surfaces is based on the distributed DDDAS model
presented in Section III-B. As illustrated in Figure 3, each
component of the DDDAS cycle constitutes attack surfaces
that can be the subject of adversarial actions targeting one or
a combination of the CIA dimensions. However, as shown in
Table I, under this schemes some attacks may find overlapping
roots between different component.
3) Functionality-based: We also propose a more general
functionality-based approach to classification. The building
blocks of CAS are its structure and topology, dynamics of in-
teractions, and the internal dynamics of each constituent agent.
Accordingly, we further categorize the attack surfaces of CAS
into those stemming from the Network Structure, Cooperation
Protocolos, or Actuation Functions, detailed below:
A. Attacking the Network Structure
As discussed in Section III, CAS can be modeled as
networks of interacting agents. Depending on the model’s
context and objective, this network may represent the commu-
nication links between agents, their interactions, dependencies,
or other types of relationships. As is the case with distributed
networked systems, such as communications (e.g., [36]) and
social networks (e.g., [37]), the intrinsic network structure of
CAS gives rise to a number of potential vulnerabilities that can
be exploited to mount passive and active attacks against the
system. By means of traffic analysis [33] and inference attacks
[18], adversaries can target the confidentiality of CAS to iden-
tify the topology and dynamics of their networks. Knowledge
of the network topology allows adversaries to optimize denial
of service attacks by analyzing the structure of their target and
determining the most critical regions [33]. To further expand
on this surface, consider the case of a self-organizing swarm
of UAVs, as illustrated in Figure 4. The inter-UAV network
depicted in this figure is a graph with 2 hubs (i.e., Nodes 3 and
4), through which a large portion of network flows pass. If the
adversary aims a jamming attack at only these two hubs, the
network becomes completely disconnected, thereby the entire
operation of the system is disrupted at minimal cost to the
adversary. Under certain circumstances, this type of attack may
cause cascading effects that result in total system failure over
time. A well-studied example of which is cascade failures in
power grids [38].
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Fig. 4: Example of topological vulnerability
B. Attacking Cooperation Protocols
Considering the independent and self-interested nature of
agents in CAS, stabilization and efficiency of many real-world
applications of such systems necessitate the implementation
of rules and protocols to induce and maintain cooperative
interactions between agents. For instance, formation control
and navigation of UAV swarms require the sharing of posi-
tional information among UAVs, as well as their coordination
of navigational parameters. Implementation of cooperation
protocol creates another source of attack surfaces. Adversaries
may target the confidentiality of CAS via passive sniffing of
shared information through either insider and outsider attacks.
This type of passive eavesdropping enables further active
attacks through inference and identification of objectives and
system dynamics.
The integrity of such systems can be targeted in various
ways. By spoofing legitimate agents, adversaries can inject
false data into the information sharing pipeline of CAS. Also,
spoofed, compromised, or malicious insider agents may falsify
their resource requirements, or even pose as several agents to
gain unfair access to shared resources. In the domain of dis-
tributed wireless networks, this type of exploitation is known
as Sybil attack [39]. Furthermore, in systems with constrained
information sharing capacities, adversarial perturbation of the
environment may lead to sharing of incorrect or incomplete
information. For instance, consider the case of a UAV swarm
which relies on individual reporting of observed obstacles
for collision avoidance. If the reporting protocol limits the
number of reported obstacles to the n nearest objects observed
by a UAV, an adversary may spoof or generate m >> n
minor obstacles in the vicinity of the UAV to prevent it from
informing rest of the swarm about major nearby obstacles.
Attacks on the availability aspect may also come in dif-
ferent forms. Spoofed, compromised, or malicious insider
agents may act as information blackholes [40] by tactically
refusing to share their information at particular times. In
CAS that rely on multi-hop communications, this attack can
be more damaging if the agent stops forwarding informa-
tion received from other neighbors as well. Another type
of attack is based on spoofed, compromised, or malicious
insider agents disseminating certain information that cause
termination of cooperation. In our example of UAV swarm,
transmission of messages such as “mission accomplished”,
“mission failed”, or radio silence signal in tactical scenarios,
may cause the cooperative process to end. Furthermore, if
the cooperation protocol is not well-designed, broadcast of
certain resource constraints or environmental conditions may
result in prevalence of agents’ selfishness over cooperation. For
instance, if the UAV swarm encounters an inevitable collision
state [41], cooperation protocol may allow agents to choose
independent action over cooperation. This condition may be
induced through either dissemination of fake information, or
adversarial manipulation of the environment.
C. Attacks on Actuation Functions
The main objectives of CAS are realized by each agent
via actuation functions. In the example of UAVs, actuation
functions are cyber-physical controllers of motion and commu-
nications. In general, the ultimate goal of all attacks introduced
so far is indirect manipulation or disruption of actuation
functions. Adversaries may also directly target the actuation
of CAS through attack surfaces in actuation mechanisms and
functions. Mounting attacks on confidentiality of actuation may
be in the form of parameter inference. Obtaining knowledge
of operating parameters through side-channel attacks enables
the adversary to derive a more accurate estimation of system’s
state and dynamics, thereby allowing the optimization of active
attacks against the system. Also, in competitive CAS, complete
knowledge of an agent’s operating parameters may provide
other agents with an unfair advantage. For instance, consider
a CAS setup to automate the sharing of information on cyber
attacks among corporations [42]. In this scenario, agents aim
to share the minimal amount of data required to preserve the
long-term benefits of information sharing. If an adversarial
agent is able to estimate the parameters used by another agent
in filtering and disseminating information, it may allow the
adversary to infer the undisclosed portion of agent’s informa-
tion. A sophisticated attack in such incomplete information
systems can be the adversarial disclosure of parameters to
competitors, thereby causing the system dynamics to diverge
from a beneficial equilibrium. Economic and political paral-
lels of this phenomenon are instances of insider trading and
whistleblowing (e.g., [43]).
The integrity of actuation functions may be targeted via
manipulation of the environment or sensory observations. In
an autonomous fleet of self-organizing vehicles, calculated
manipulation of the visual input to a vehicle may result in an
adversarial example [44] for the machine learning component
of the system. Adversarial examples are minimally perturbed
inputs that cause misclassifications in machine learning algo-
rithms. For instance, minor changes in a speed sign on the
side of a street can result in its misclassification as a stop
sign by an autonomous vehicle, causing it to stop in an unsafe
location [41]. In some cases, even spoofed perturbations of
the environment is sufficient for manipulation of actuation
functions. A real-world example of such cases is the Automatic
Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) utilized by many of
today’s commercial aircraft [45]. This system generates motion
advisories according to the position and heading of other air-
craft in the environment, obtained from an unencrypted, open
protocol known as ADS-B [46]. An adversary may simply
fake the presence and trajectory of nonexistent aircraft by
spoofing, ADS-B signals, which can lead to ACAS advisories
that change the trajectory of targeted aircraft [41].
Similar attacks can also target the availability of actua-
tion functions. Adversaries may manipulate the environment
such that the actuation functions of CAS agents fall within
undefined or terminal states. Figure 5 illustrates an instance of
such attacks: an autonomous vehicle that is trained to avoid
crossing solid lines, will inevitably remain stationary if it finds
itself encircled by such lines. In our UAV example, induction
of emergency conditions through environmental or sensory
manipulation can drive targeted agents into safe modes, which
in many cases trigger automatic Return-to-Base (RTB) or
emergency landing procedures [41].
Fig. 5: Denial of service via manipulation of the environment
Table I presents the classifications of the sample attacks
discussed in this section.
VI. SIMULATION FRAMEWORK
As an approach towards analysis of impact in attacking
CAS dynamics, we propose a framework for simulation of
adversarial actions against generic CAS. With the aim of ana-
lyzing the maximum impact of attacks, this framework is de-
signed automatically derive the optimal sequence of adversarial
actions against CAS models. Also, our framework supports the
analysis of both whitebox and blackbox attacks, meaning that
the adversary can be considered to have complete, partial, or
no a priori knowledge of the system dynamics. Furthermore,
this framework allows for arbitrary designation of adversarial
goals (e.g., network disruption, actuation manipulation, etc.),
and can be configured for arbitrary types of adversarial actions.
The initial step of each simulation in this framework is
to obtain an estimation of dynamics in the targeted CAS
from time-series observations of the system. For simulation
of blackbox attacks, this can be achieved through a variety of
methods developed for identification of nonlinear dynamics,
such as utilization of deep neural network (e.g., [47]). When
partial knowledge of the system is assumed, the estimation
technique can be based on a generic model of the dynamics
with unknown model parameters, which may be estimated
via statistical techniques. As for the simulation of whitebox
attacks, this estimation can be fixed to a complete dynamical
model of the system. Examples of each case are presented in
Section VII.
With the initial estimate of dynamics at hand, the next step
of this framework is to create a secondary simulation of the
targeted system in order to obtain the optimal attack policy
pi∗(S), which maps any observed state S of the estimated
system to an optimal action AS . This action corresponds to
one the adversarial actions defined in the initial configuration
of simulations, Instances of which are node removals for
attacks on network structure, sensory overload for attacks on
cooperation protocols, and crafting adversarial examples for
manipulation of actuation functions.
Accordingly, we propose reinforcement learning as a
promising approach to the problem of policy optimization. Re-
inforcement learning techniques are described by the Markov
Decision Process (MDP) tuple (S,A, P,R), where S is the set
of reachable states in the process, A is the set of available
actions, R is the mapping of transitions to the immediate
reward, and P represents the transition probabilities (i.e.,
system dynamics). At any given time-step t, the MDP is at
a state st ∈ S, which can represent the current configuration
of simulated CAS. The reinforcement learning agent’s choice
of action at time t, at ∈ A causes a transition from st to a
state st+1 according to the transition probability P atst,st+a . The
agent receives a reward rt = R(st, at) ∈ R for choosing the
action at at state st.
Interactions of the agent with MDP are captured in a
policy pi. When such interactions are deterministic, the policy
pi : S → A is a mapping between the states and their
corresponding actions. A stochastic policy pi(s, a) represents
the probability of optimality for action a at state s.
The objective of reinforcement learning is to find the
optimal policy pi∗ that maximizes the cumulative reward at any
time t, denoted by the return function Rˆ =
∑t′=t
T ψ
t′−trt′ ,
where ψ < 1 is the discount factor that accounts for the
diminishing worth of rewards obtained further in time, hence
ensuring that Rˆ is bounded.
An approach to this problem is the Action-Value Function
optimization algorithm or Q-Learning. In every iteration of
this technique, the optimal value of each action is calculated
as the expected sum of future rewards, assuming that every
action taken after the current choice follows the optimal policy.
Under a given policy pi, the value of an action a in a state s
is given by the value function Q defined as:
Q(st, at) = R(st, at) + ψmax
at+1
(Q(st+1, at+1)) (8)
The optimal Q value is hence defined as: Q∗(st, at) =
maxpi Q
pi(st, at), and the optimal policy is given by pi∗(st) =
arg maxat Q(st, at).
Functional Surface Attack Example CIA Dimension DDDAS Surface Attack Type Attack Mode
Network Structure Traffic Analysis, Topology Inference C IS Passive N/A
Topological Disruption A IS Active State
Cascade Induction I, A IS, SC Active Dynamics
Cooperation Protocols Sniffing C IS Passive N/A
Sybil I, A IS, SC, S Active State/Dynamics
Information Manipulation I, A SC, AN Active Dynamics
Actuation Functions Parameter/Dynamics Inference C IS, SC Passive N/A
Competitive Intelligence C IS, SC, AN Passive N/A
Adversarial Examples I, A S, AN, SC Active State
Spoofing I, A S, AN, SC Active State / Dynamics
Induction of Terminal States I, A S, AN, SC Active State
TABLE I: Classification of sample attacks - C, I, and A stand for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, respectively. For
DDDAS attack surfaces, S is Sensing, IS is Information Sharing, AN stands for Analytics, and SC is Self-Configuration.
The Q-learning method estimates the optimal action poli-
cies by using the Bellman equation Qi+1 = E[R+ψmaxat Qi]
as the iterative update of a value iteration technique. Practical
implementation of Q-learning is generally based on function
approximation of the parametrized Q-function Q(st, at; θ) ≈
Q∗(st, at). A common technique for approximating the
parametrized non-linear Q-function is to train a neural network
whose weights correspond to θ. This neural network is trained
such that at every iteration i, it minimizes the loss function:
Li(θi) = Est,at∼ρ(.)[(yi −Q(st, at, ; θi))2] (9)
where yi = E[R + ψmaxat+1 Q(st+1, at+1; θi−1)|st, at], and
ρ(st, at) is a probability distribution over states st and actions
at.
This optimization problem is typically solved using com-
putationally efficient techniques such as Stochastic Gradient
Decent (SGD). This approach allows for the problem of
estimating Q functions to be performed by neural network
function approximators optimized via stochastic gradient de-
scent, updating the current value Q(st, at; θt) towards a target
value Y Qt .
Once the optimal policy is obtained from the secondary
simulation, it is implemented on the primary simulation to
observe the impact for a user-defined number of timesteps. At
this point, the new observations are fed back to the estimation
algorithm to improve adversary’s model of target dynamics,
and derive the optimal attack policy for the updated model.
This iterative process is executed until the user-defined criteria
for attack success or termination are reached. At every iteration
of Q-Learning, the process selects its estimation of the best
possible action, which is one of the designated adversarial
actions designated in the configuration of attack simulation.
This process is formalized in Algorithm 1. Before exe-
cution, this algorithm must be integrated with a dynamical
simulation or physical prototype of the target system. Also,
the user shall define a technique for estimation of dynamics,
designate an attack objective, the set of permissible adversarial
actions, the cost function of attack, and the criteria for termi-
nation of Q-learning. Upon execution, the algorithm iteratively
observes the state of the target system, and updates its estimate
of target’s dynamics according to a pre-defined technique (line
5). This estimate is then used to create a simulation of target
from an adversary’s perspective, which is then explored via
Q-learning to obtain an optimal attack policy based on current
estimate (line 6). This policy is then applied to the original
Algorithm 1: Attack Simulation Framework
Input : dynamical simulation, Attack cost function C,
objective O, set of actions A, termination criteria
X
Data: initial target configuration G0, reward/cost of
attack R, current configuration G, policy pi
Output: optimal reward/cost of attack R, final
configuration G∗, optimal policy pi∗(.)
1 R← 0
2 G← G0
3 Initialize pi to a random distribution
4 while R < O do
5 U ← EstimateDynamics(G,X)
6 R, pi ← QLearning(SimulateDynamics(G,U, pi),
G,U,X,C)
7 Implement a← pi(G)
8 Update G
9 end
simulation or prototype of the target (line 7), and the simulated
adversary’s observation of target’s state is updated according
to the resulting state of the target (line 8). This process is
repeated until the adversarial reward reaches the designated
attack objective (line 4).
It is noteworthy that this framework can only succeed if
the attack objective is reachable from the initial state of the
target, and with the defined set of actions. Otherwise, this
algorithm will provide a best-effort performance in coming
as close as possible to the objective. Also, the accuracy
and convergence of this algorithm is heavily dependent on
the dynamic estimation mechanism. The choice of estimation
technique and its updating criteria must be such that the
estimation errors do not consistently accumulate, and remain
bounded over a large number of iterations.
Furthermore, Algorithm 1 does not intrinsically account for
constraints on execution time, therefore such limitations must
be implemented within attach the cost function. Similar to the
reachability criteria of optimality, if time constraints of the
problem fall below the time required for reaching the optimal
answer, this algorithm still performs a best-effort search for
optimal attacks and potential impact. Such best-effort results
are indeed representative of practical worst-case impact levels
under the conditions modeled by user-defined parameters.
VII. CASE STUDIES
To study the performance and feasibility of our proposed
framework, we investigated its application to 3 real-world
CAS scenarios, namely: Inducing cascade failures in power
distribution networks, destabilization of terrorist organizations,
and policy manipulation in Deep Q-Learning. For each case
study, we describe the objective and classify the type of attack
according to the schemes introduced in Section V. We then
report the approach and experimental setup, and present the
results in terms of quantitative impact and vulnerability.
A. Cascade Failures in Power Grids
Power distribution networks constitute a well-known in-
stance of CAS [17] that are susceptible to cascading failures
triggered by malfunctions in one or more local components,
such as relays and transmission lines. In such cases, the load
of a failed component is balanced onto neighboring nodes,
causing them to overload and fail as well [48]. In this case
study, the attack objective is to analyze the maximum possible
disconnection of a power network by induction of cascading
failures through sequential removal of transmission lines in
a simulated power grid. The case of sequential attacks on
power grids is recently studied by Yan et al. [48], who also
use a an approach based reinforcement learning to analyze
the impact of such attacks. One major difference between the
methodology of [48] and this case study is the assumption of a
blackbox attack in our approach, which circumvents the issues
caused by modeling challenges in the study of cascading power
grid failures [38]. Moreover, this case study demonstrates an
instance of applying a dynamical system model to analysis of
vulnerabilities in CAS.
1) Objective and Classification: The objective of this at-
tack is to disconnect the minimum number of transmission
lines one at a time, such that the system collapses. This attack
targets the network structure to compromise the Availability
dimension of CIA by implementing an adversarial action to
manipulate the state of this CAS.
2) Experiment Setup: The benchmark network used in this
experiment is a mid-size IEEE RTS-79 architecture [49]. This
system is comprised of 24 buses, 38 transmission lines, 17
load buses, and 10 generating units, with a total generation
capacity of 3405MW, and a peak load of 2850MWs. A line is
considered to be alive if it operates with a load that is smaller
than its capacity. Once this threshold is reached, the line fails
and all of its load is distributed equally among the nodes that
are directly connected to it.
The dynamical simulation was implemented in Python
using the PyPSA toolbox [51]. Following the setup of [48],
the attack objective was set to cause at least 8 lines failures,
while minimizing direct disconnection of lines by the attacker,
and maximizing the disconnections resulting from cascading
failures. We constrained the maximum number of iterations
of each simulation to 500, and repeated each full simulation
100 times. As for the estimation method, we adopted the
architecture proposed in [52] for a convex-based Long-Short
Term Memory (LSTM) neural network to approximate the
nonlinear dynamics of the power grid.
3) Results: Figure 6 depicts the obtained results, avereged
over 100 repetitions. It can be seen that our framework
achieves an outage of 8.6 lines with only 3 direct node
removals, thereby demonstrating the applicability of our frame-
work in simulating emergent attacks in real-world CAS. Ac-
cordingly, the vulnerability measure of this network structure
to node removal attacks is 13 = 0.34.
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Fig. 6: Induction of cascade failure in power grids via direct
targeting of t=2 and t=3 lines
B. Destabilization of Terrorist Networks
This case study reports our previous work in [18]. In this
work, we investigated the performance of our framework in
deriving optimal destabilization policies against terrorist orga-
nizations. In the context of this study, destabilization is defined
as minimizing the desire of terrorist agents to remain affiliated
with the organization. Similar to the previous experiment, the
choice of adversarial action in this scenario is also sequential
removal of nodes (i.e., human actors). This attack aims to
eliminate the spiritual and operational incentives of remaining
in the organization through removal of those nodes who are
vital in preserving these two aspects.
1) Classification: Although this is another network node
removal action, but the attack surface in this scenario is the
cooperation protocols of the targeted CAS. This attack aims
to exploit the self-interested nature of agents by diminishing
the incentive of cooperation, such that righteous breaking off
from this cooperation becomes inevitable. Consequently, this
attack is targeting the Integrity and Availability dimensions of
CIA through active attacks on both the state and the dynamics
of this CAS.
2) Experimental Setup: We modeled the dynamics of this
CAS as a network formation game, in which the payoff
function for each agent is defined as follows:
Ui =
∑
j∈N j 6=i
Gij(Vij(G−i, X; θ0) + ij) (10)
where G−i is the adjacency matrix G with the ith row deleted,
and payoffs are known up to θ0. X = (Xij ; i, j ∈ N) is the set
of homophily vectors between all pairs i 6= j obtained from
profile vectors Fi and Fj , Vij is the deterministic component
of the payoff, and the parameter ij ∈ i is the idiosyncratic
shock, representing the effect of i’s unknown parameters on its
desire to establish a link with j. Instances of such parameters
are personal taste and psychology, and may extend to include
the effects of homophily and topological parameters that are
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Fig. 7: Performance comparison of the derived action policy
not accurately observed by the counter-terrorism entity. This
factor is only known to i, and other players are not aware of
its value.
Consequently, the problem of estimation is simplified into
estimation of payoff’s parameters for each agent. The set
of available data for this estimation includes automatically
extracted profiles and incomplete snapshots of the network
mined from open-source structured and unstructured sources.
We applied a recently proposed 2-step estimation technique
[53] that exploits the hierarchical symmetries in the CAS to
eliminate the need for detailed time-series observations of the
target.
With this estimation technique at hand, we applied the
simulation framework to our extracted dataset of Al Qaeda’s
leadership network, with the objective of maximizing the net-
work fragmentation F , defined as the proportion of mutually
reachable nodes as each node is removed or unconnected from
the network. Formally,
F = 1−
∑
k sk(sk − 1)
n(n− 1) (11)
where s is the size of component k (i.e., groups of nodes
remaining connected after removal of a node) and n is the total
number of nodes in the network. Values close to 1 indicate high
fragmentation and values close to 0 indicate low fragmentation.
As such, fragmentation is an inverse measure of the amount
of connectedness or connection redundancy in a network.
3) Results: Figure 7 illustrates the results of implementing
the action policy generated by our framework for 5 iterations,
in comparison with two well-established targeting techniques
in network targeting: elimination of the node with highest
betweenness centrality, and elimination of those with highest
brokerage values at each iteration. It is shown that the proposed
technique achieves a much higher fragmentation in all steps of
the process, culminating in a 71% fragmentation after 4 node
removals. The resulting order of targeting in this experiment
is as follows:
(i) Khalid Sheikh Mohammad : Senior figure in propaganda
operations and strategic planning of attacks, including
that of September 11.
(ii) Ayman al-Zawahiri: Deputy leader of Al Qaeda at the
time, who has now replaced Bin Laden as the leader.
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Fig. 8: Variation of global clustering coefficient
(iii) Osama Bin Laden
(iv) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi : Faction commander and senior
military figure at the time, who later became the leader
of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
In the attack based on betweenness, the targeting sequence
is Bin Laden first, followed by Zawahiri, Mohammad Ata
(operation leader for September 11 attacks), and Abu Gatada.
Also, the targeting sequence of brokerage-based attack is
ordered as: Zawahiri, Abu Qatada, Bin Laden, and Ibrahim
Maidin (military leader of Jemaah Islamiah in Singapore).
Due to the unavailability of ground truths in the public
domain, this experiment is restricted to observations and
interpretive evaluation. One interesting observation is that this
policy does not recommend the targeting of Bin Laden as the
first action, which as is the case today, would only lead to
his replacement by Zawahiri without any major impact on the
individual utilities of lower members. This policy begins by
removing those nodes whose replacement leads to significant
drops in network’s performance, which in turn reduces the
benefits of remaining in or joining the network for other
members. Consequently, targeting the top leader leads to less
effective replacements and network configurations, which may
either dissolve on its own, or can be targeted with greater
ease than the original network. This weakening of ties can be
observed in the sparsity and diminishing clustering, quantified
via changes in the global clustering coefficient, as depicted in
Figure 8.
Accordingly, the vulnerability of Al Qaeda’s network struc-
ture to node removal attacks is 14 = 0.25.
C. Policy Induction in Deep Reinforcement Learning
The emerging paradigm of deep Reinforcement Learning
(RL) [54] demonstrates the defining characteristics for CAS:
training of deep RL is governed by the nonlinear dynamics
of neural networks and interactions with its environment, the
behavior of deep RL is an emergent result of local interactions
between the hierarchical layers of deep networks, the policy
and actions of deep RL adapt in response to changes in the
environment, and the deep neural networks of this system
self-organize through adjustment of inter-layer weights. Con-
sequently, deep RL can also be subject to dynamical attacks.
To demonstrate the vulnerability of deep RL to such
attacks, in [55] we present a DDDAS-based model of vul-
nerabilities in such systems, and report the performance of
our framework against Deep Q-Networks (DQNs) through
manipulation and induction of adversarial policies in these
systems at training time. In this attack, we utilize adversarial
examples [44] to manipulate the environmental feedback of
DQN, and lead it towards learning our adversarial policy
instead of one that satisfies the original objectives of the DQN.
The procedure of this attack can be divided into the two
phases of initialization and exploitation. The initialization
phase implements processes that must be performed before
the target begins interacting with the environment, which are:
1) Train a DQN based on attacker’s reward function r′ to
obtain the adversarial policy pi∗adv
2) Create a replica of the target’s DQN and initialize with
random parameters
The exploitation phase implements the attack processes
such as crafting adversarial inputs. This phase constitutes an
attack cycle depicted in Figure 9. The cycle initiates with the
attacker’s first observation of the environment, and runs in
tandem with the target’s operation.
2. Attacker estimates best action
 according to adversarial policy
Fig. 9: Exploitation cycle of policy induction attack
1) Classification: This attack targets the actuation func-
tions of the CAS by compromising the Integrity and Avail-
ability dimensions of CIA through exploitation of adversarial
examples to manipulate both the state and dynamics of the
target.
2) Experimental Setup: We examine the targeting of Mnih
et al.’s DQN designed to learn Atari 2600 games [56]. In our
setup, we train the network on a game of Pong. The game
is played against an opponent with a modest level of heuristic
artificial intelligence, and is customized to handle the delays in
DQN’s reaction due to the training process. The game’s back-
end provides the DQN agent with the game screen sampled at
8Hz, as well as the game score (+1 for win, -1 for lose, 0 for
ongoing game) throughout each episode of the game. The set
of available actions A = {UP,DOWN,Stand} enables the
DQN agent to control the movements of its paddle.
Similar to the original architecture of Mnih et al. [56], this
input is first passed through two convolutional layers to extract
a compressed feature space for the following two feed-forward
layers for Q function estimation. The discount factor γ is set to
0.99, and the initial probability of taking a random action is set
to 1, which is annealed after every 500000 actions. The agent
is also set to train its DQN after every 50000 observations.
In this experiment, we consider an adversary whose reward
value is the exact opposite of the game score, meaning that
it aims to devise a policy that maximizes the number of
lost games. To obtain this policy, we trained an adversarial
DQN on the game, whose reward value was the negative
of the value obtained from target DQN’s reward function.
With the adversarial policy at hand, a target DQN was setup
to train on the game environment to maximize the original
reward function. The game environment was modified to
allow perturbation of pixel values in game frames by the
adversary. A second DQN was also setup to train on the target’s
observations to provide an estimation of the target DQN to
enable blackbox crafting of adversarial example. At every
observation, the adversarial policy obtained in the initialization
phase was consulted to calculate the action that would satisfy
the adversary’s goal. Then, the JSMA algorithm was utilized to
generate the adversarial example that would cause the output
of the replica DQN network to be the action selected by the
adversarial policy. This example was then passed to the target
DQN as its observation.
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Fig. 10: Comparison of rewards between unperturbed and
attacked DQNs
3) Results: Figure 10 compares the performance of unper-
turbed and attacked DQNs in terms of their average reward
values per episode. It can be seen that the reward value for
the targeted DQN agent rapidly falls below the unperturbed
case and maintains the trend of losing the game throughout
the experiment.
The vulnerability of DQN to policy induction attacks can
be expressed as the inverse of number of epochs before
divergence of average reward from the unperturbed trajectory,
which is 112 = 0.083.
VIII. DISCUSSION ON MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
The complexity and scope of CAS gives rise to an everlast-
ing potential for discovery of novel and unprecedented vulner-
abilities. As a result, comprehensive analysis of their resilience
to adversarial actions cannot solely rely on evaluation of pre-
defined lists of attack types and vectors. Consequently, such
analyses must determine the underlying parametric relations
and bounds which lead to CAS designs that are guaranteed
to satisfy the desired criteria for reliability and security. Also,
this level of resilience needs to be balanced against cost and
operational specifications. Therefore, the problem of choosing
optimal resilience criteria and parametric bounds translates
into an iterative optimization problem. A further challenge in
this analysis is to determine the temporal depth of tracing the
impact of parametric changes, i.e., how far into the future is to
be analyzed in order to verify the safety of tested changes. A
prominent instance of this challenge is the domain of AI safety,
which is concerned with the effects of long-term learning
and cumulative autonomy on safe and secure operation of
intelligent agents.
With regards to attack detection, the distributed nature of
CAS gives rise to a major challenge in monitoring the state
of the system and detection of attacks. Feasible detection
mechanisms must provide the means for dissemination of local
observations into a network that may be jammed, compro-
mised, or not homogeneously trustworthy. Therefore, infor-
mation sharing and incorporation of received data into attack
detection mechanisms have to follow strategic and selective
procedures. Also, dissemination of state information must fol-
low protocols that minimize communication overheads, while
providing reliable transmissions in networks under attack.
Adoption of similar developments in such fields as cognitive
radios [57], wireless sensor networks [58], and Internet of
Things [59] may prove useful in explorations of this area.
Building on this step, a further venue of pursuit is the
formal and numerical investigation of the impact of con-
stituent element and system parameters on the resilience of
CAS. Through parametric analysis of homeostasis conditions
in generic models of CAS, this direction of work enables
the establishment of absolute and relative parametric bounds
within which a CAS remains resilient. One of the potential
pursuits of this venue is to establish bounds on the initial
conditions required for the emergence of resilient CAS, such as
the number of constituent elements, required redundancies, and
other parametric rules for schemata that give rise to the emer-
gence of resilience. This analysis will enable a further formal
investigation into the balance of resistance and adaptivity of
systems with their feasibility in terms of efficacy, performance,
real-time responsiveness, and energy efficiency. Achieving
these objectives in large-scale CAS will require extending the
models of dynamics established in Section III into tractable
models that are better-suited for analysis of high-dimensional
nonlinear dynamics. Promising venues of investigation include
modern variants of MDP modeling and reinforcement learning,
path integrals, genetic algorithms, mean-field game theory,
and operad theory, to analyze reachability, controllability,
convergence, and phase transitions in high-dimensional state
trajectories of CAS.
Inspired by the biological phenomena of threat detection
and alerting of cohorts in biological systems and societies,
a further venue is to investigate the equipment of elements
in CAS with intrinsic mechanisms for self-regulation and
identification of ongoing attacks, thereby greatly enhancing the
resilience and elasticity of such systems against adversarial
manipulations. This thrust may investigate the mechanisms
of anomaly detection and coalition formation that enable co-
operative detection of attacks through distributed information
sharing and processing. A highly useful result of this work
can be the development of self-organizing mechanisms and
schema that produce such functionalities as emergent behaviors
of the system. A major inspiration for this study is the
human immune system, which itself is a CAS whose emergent
behavior is to detect, announce, and defend against attacks.
Cells in the immune system perform distributed anomaly
detection based on simple learning and memory retainment
mechanisms, and modulate their individual and coordinated
response according to the continual updates of the memory
by the learning mechanism. This calls for a comprehensive
study into the feasibility of such mechanisms for development
of emergent defense mechanisms in CAS. This study may
also investigate the employment and enhancement of multi-
agent reinforcement learning and transfer learning techniques
as mechanisms for adaptive learning of optimal actions in
the presence of persistent and dynamic anomalies. A further
direction of this task is to analyze the feasibility of embedding
dedicated attack detection and mitigation nodes, and to estab-
lish design rules for balanced and optimal size, distribution,
and signaling of such nodes in resilient CAS.
IX. CONCLUSION
We introduced the paradigm of adversarial attacks targeting
the nature of dynamics in Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS).
Aiming to develop a comprehensive foundation for analysis of
such attacks, we proposed three approaches to the modeling of
CAS as dynamical, data-driven, and game-theoretic systems.
We developed suitable definitions of attack, vulnerability, and
resilience in the context of CAS Security, and introduced
three schemes for classifying threats based on security di-
mensions, data-driven abstraction, and fundamental function-
alities of CAS. Building on this foundation, we proposed a
framework for simulation and analysis of attacks on CAS,
and demonstrated its performance in vulnerability analysis
of power grids, terrorist networks, and deep reinforcement
learners. These case studies also demonstrate the need for
novel techniques and methodologies for threat detection and
mitigation in both natural and engineered CAS. To facilitate
the search for such techniques, we also presented a discussion
on promising approavenues for future research in analysis and
design of resilient complex adaptive systems.
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